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Abstract 
This article scrutinizes Michael Crichton’s movie Westworld (1973), its sequel Futureworld (1976), 
and the spin-off series Beyond Westworld (1980), as well as the critical literature that deals with 
them. I examine whether Crichton’s movie, its sequel, and the 1980s series contain and convey a 
consistent technophobic message according to the definition of “technophobia” advanced in Daniel 
Dinello’s 2005 monograph. I advance a proposal to develop further the concept of technophobia in 
order to offer a more satisfactory and unified interpretation of the narratives at stake. I connect 
technophobia and what I call de-theologized, epistemic hubris: the conclusion is that fearing 
technology is philosophically meaningful if one realizes that the limitations of technology are the 
consequence of its creation and usage on behalf of epistemically limited humanity (or artificial 
minds). 
Keywords: Westworld, Futureworld, Beyond Westworld, Michael Crichton, androids, technology, 
technophobia, Daniel Dinello, hubris. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The 2016 and 2018 HBO series Westworld by Jonathan Nolan and Lisa Joy has spawned 
renewed interest in the 1973 movie with the same title by Michael Crichton (1942-2008), 
its 1976 sequel Futureworld by Richard T. Heffron (1930-2007), and the short-lived 1980 
MGM TV series Beyond Westworld. The movies and the series deal with androids used for 
recreational purposes and raise questions about technology and its risks. I aim at an as-yet 
unattempted comparative analysis taking the narratives at stake as technophobic tales: 
each one conveys a feeling of threat and fear related to technological beings and 
environments. In so doing, I draw upon Daniel Dinello’s monograph Technophobia! Science 
Fiction Visions of Posthuman Technology (Dinello 2005). Following his definition, 
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technophobia “is meant to suggest an aversion to, dislike of, or suspicion of technology 
rather than an irrational, illogical, or neurotic fear” (Dinello 2005, 8). My guiding question 
is: what exactly is the inherent problem or threat related to technology that spectators are 
being warned of? This involves two other questions: Can technophobia be broken down to 
one or more elements, identified with clarity and certainty? If multiple elements are 
pinpointed, is it still possible to reach a unified definition of technophobia itself?  
I discuss multiple critical contributions and group them under the macro-topics that 
they set out to analyze (respectively: robots, society, scientists, technology vs. 
nature/humanity). I show that each attempt on behalf of critics at identifying one key 
concept instantiated in the narratives does yield inspiring insights, yet none are ever 
exhaustive and convincing from a philosophical viewpoint. In fact, upon first examination, 
the very movies and series seem to be riddled with inconsistencies and poorly developed 
ideas. I advance, in my turn, a unified and overall interpretation. Such reading allows one to 
see the three narratives as sharing the same message, and covers the majority of elements 
present in each of them, including some ignored in critical literature. It also constructively 
engages with the critics’ insights, coordinating them while overstepping them. I namely 
connect technophobia and what I call de-theologized, epistemic hubris. My conclusion is that 
fearing technology is philosophically meaningful if one realizes that the limitations of 
technology are the consequence of its creation and usage on behalf of epistemically limited 
humanity (or artificial minds). Ultimately, the real threat stems from overconfidence in 
one’s capacities to devise failure-proof technology, or in technology as having unlimited 
capacities. I argue as well that neither such reading nor the narratives at stake warrant an 
irrational, “neo-luddite,” overall refusal of technology.  
2. Synopses 
Westworld  
Delos is a resort comprising three areas representing respectively 13th century Europe 
(Medieval World), Imperial Rome (Roman World), and the 19th century American frontier 
(Western World or Westworld: here, the italicized name refers to the movie, the plain 
version to the area). Guests interact with perfect replicas of humans, except that their 
finger joints display unnatural ridges and their eyes a metallic shine. Visitors can indulge in 
their whims, including having sexual intercourse with robots or killing them without being 
harmed (guns are equipped with heat sensors that prevent them from being fired at 
humans). A group of supervisors and controllers in a room reminiscent of a NASA control 
center steers the park, as nurse-looking technicians repair damaged robots overnight. 
Peter Martin and John Blane are two guests exploring Westworld. Peter gradually loses his 
inhibitions. He shoots down a sinister gunslinger1 and makes love to a prostitute. The 
robots start to display malfunctions that one supervisor compares to an “infectious 
disease.” He points out that the robots have been designed by computers; the supervisors 
themselves “do not know exactly how they work.” His concerns are not taken seriously by 
his colleagues who downplay the significance of data as well as his hypothesis. 
Malfunctions escalate. Although convinced that the current guests’ safety is guaranteed and 
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a total shutdown would negatively impact the tourists’ confidence, the supervisors stop 
accepting new visitors. The situation worsens: in Medieval World a guest’s advances are 
rejected by a maiden and he is eventually killed by a black knight. John is shot dead by the 
gunslinger that then starts pursuing Peter. The supervisors lose control over the system, 
and when it shuts down they die asphyxiated in the airtight rooms of their control center. 
As Peter is fleeing through the park, the gunslinger kills a technician who is trying to escape 
on a golf cart. Eventually Peter manages to splash the robot with acid (as suggested by the 
technician) and set it on fire. While wandering through Medieval World, Peter encounters a 
woman chained in a dungeon. He offers her a sip of water only to discover that she too is a 
machine, which short-circuits after coming into contact with the water. The gunslinger 
reaches Peter but it is so severely damaged that it falls to the ground in charred ruins. 
Exhausted, Peter sits on a flight of stairs and remembers Delos’ advertisement: “Boy, have 
we got a vacation for you…” 
Futureworld 
Two years after the disaster, Delos is reopened, larger and allegedly failsafe. Newspaper 
reporter Chuck Browning and TV commentator Tracy Ballard are given a free stay but they 
are encouraged to produce a favorable review. Tracy is enthusiastic but Chuck is 
suspicious: he has been promised revelations about Delos by a man who, right before being 
mortally stabbed, left him an envelope full of newspaper clippings about prominent people. 
Delos representative Mr. Duffy shows them around. Chuck and Tracy join tourists in 
Futureworld (a sci-fi like experience in an orbiting station and a trip to Mars), then they are 
given a “behind the scenes” tour and discover that the Control Center is manned by robots. 
In the nighttime, after having been drugged, Delos guests, including Chuck and Tracy, fall in 
a deep sleep and undergo a biological scanning by technicians in red overalls. Tracy wakes 
up frightened, believing the experience was a nightmare. While exploring Delos without 
permission, she and Chuck are attacked by robot samurais. They are rescued by Harry 
Croft, a mechanic who has been employed at Delos since the park’s opening. He lives 
underground with a faceless android and knew the murdered informer, also a technician. 
Their conversation is interrupted by Dr. Schneider, the resort’s scientific director, who 
takes Chuck and Tracy back to their lodgings. They are shown a prospective park 
attraction, a device videotaping a person’s most intimate desires. Tried on Tracy, it reveals 
fantasies of a gunslinger in dark clothes. With Harry’s help, Chuck and Tracy uncover a 
conspiracy: prominent visitors (including them) are being replaced with replicas so that 
Delos can take over the world. Mr. Duffy, shot down, turns out to be a robot. Chuck and 
Tracy are chased by their replicas and the spectator is left wondering until the end whether 
humans or machines prevailed and escaped under the nose of Dr. Schneider. 
Beyond Westworld 
Some years have passed after the Westworld disaster. The park’s failure is explained as the 
result of the manipulation of Dr. Simon Quaid, who had taken possession of over two 
hundred androids. Each episode narrates an attempt on his behalf to replace people in key 
positions in order to take over the world. While Delos is engaged in thwarting his schemes, 
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the company is also developing robots to perform useful tasks. Dr. Quaid tries to take 
control of a nuclear submarine (1. Westworld Destroyed) and of an oil company (2. My 
Brother’s Keeper). He steals uranium from a nuclear plant and uses it in a bomb built in an 
android-replacement of a rock band member (3. The Sound of Terror). He infiltrates a pilot 
crew working with an experimental car (4. The Lion). He tests a device to control humans 
and he replaces the California governor with a robot (5. Takeover). The Delos team 
comprises security agent John Moore, his aid Pamela Williams, and Professor 
Oppenheimer. Each time, their success is due to a combination of Dr. Quaid’s blunders, Dr. 
Oppenheimer’s knowledge and expertise in all things android, the agents’ superior physical 
as well as intuitive skills and hard work, and each robot’s technical faults or shortcomings. 
As stated in the first episode by Delos expert Laura Garvey, “Each robot has a different 
weakness.” Agent Moore adds, “And calls for a different weapon.”  
3. Literature Review 
Most of the literature has focused on the first movie. In what follows I offer a systematic 
discussion grouped according to the main topic or challenge that each author has chosen to 
concentrate upon. 
3.1 Critics focusing on the challenges presented by human-like robots 
Antonio Fabozzi devotes a whole chapter of his 1982 monograph Il cinema della paura. 
Orrore e fantascienza nel cinema americano degli anni ’70 e ’80 (“The Cinema of Fear: 
Horror and Science Fiction in the American Movies of the 1970s/1980s”) to Westworld. He 
interprets the movie as based on the “machines’ rebellion” with the significant variant that 
such machines are exploited for human leisure, or otium, and not for labor and business, or 
negotium (Fabozzi, 165). He points out that the machines are a symbol of human labor 
workers and that the whole movie evokes the alienation both of the exploited and the 
exploiters (166). However, Fabozzi also refers to the contraposition between 
mechanism/rationality/routine (machine) and instinct/emotion/creativity (human) as one 
of the main themes of the movie. He points out the irony in the fact that, in order to 
surprise the robot and splash it with acid, Peter has to pretend he too is a robot by lying 
silently among damaged androids in the subterranean laboratory (171-172).  
In “Technophobic Themes in Pre-1990 Computer Films,” Anton Karl Kozlovic lists 
both Westworld and its sequel among the movies that display robots as “sex companions” 
under the more general category of “cybersex violations” and described as “the feminist 
fear” (Kozlovic, 359-361).2 The two movies, in other words, may work as a metaphor for 
the objectification or de-humanization entailed by prostitution and human trafficking.  
In “Horrifying ‘Boredom’ in Michael Crichton’s Fictions,” James Whitlark offers a 
psychological interpretation. He examines the role of “boredom” in Crichton’s fiction that 
Crichton himself conceptualized as a fundamental ingredient of terror in a passage from his 
novel Congo (1980). “Boredom” means lack of stimulation under adverse circumstances: an 
ambiguous Freudian concept that if on the one hand represents liberation from affection, it 
is at the same time deeply frightening–a variety of despair. At the apex of a terrifying 
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situation, characters find themselves unable to respond, overwhelmed and hence bored 
according to such definition. In other words, according to Whitlark’s analysis, Crichton’s 
narratives often display characters’ “listlessness at the most nerve-racking moments” 
(Whitlark, 237), and boredom is also elicited in Crichton’s reader through long passages 
that suspend suspense. This condition of listlessness is represented by Crichton, according 
to Whitlark, with “increasing consciousness” and associated with situations of 
powerlessness, like in the case of the suffocated scientists in Westworld (232). According to 
him, the robots of Westworld are boredom-generators because they are not psychologically 
interesting or fathomable; they are beings about whom nothing can be done (235-236). 
Westworld is touched upon in Dinello’s monograph. Crichton’s 1973 movie, as well 
as its sequel, are briefly discussed by him in a chapter exploring the technophobic variant 
of the “machines out of control,” and more precisely in a section which examines a sub-
subcategory called “techno-rebellion: revolt of the androids” (Dinello, 106). Westworld, 
according to Dinello, points to “the potential of uncontrollable and devastating software 
errors that are possible in a vast technological system” and to the fact that technology can 
become incomprehensible to its creators (107). He also briefly discusses Futureworld. 
According to him, the sequel “goes further” in comparison with the original and evokes “the 
notion that technology possesses a force or even an agenda of its own” (107).  
In “Mensch-Maschinen” (Human-machines) Stefan Höltgen analyzes robot movies 
between the 1970s and the 1990s. He likens the robots’ “revolt” in Westworld to the 
uprising of slaves, yet he also remarks how technicians try to understand the phenomenon 
as a “disease” (Höltgen 2009). In a similar way, he describes Futureworld as conveying “a 
specific cultural angst” that emerged from the 1970s onwards: the fear that machines 
would replace humans, which he interprets as being related to humanity’s struggle to find a 
place for itself in a daily life increasingly populated by machines occupying roles previously 
belonging to real persons.  
In “Os autômatos da ficção científica,” (The Automata of Science Fiction) Fátima 
Regis analyses the representation of androids in the movies over time. In her historical 
analysis, those of Westworld fall into the category of androids created in the human being’s 
image and likeness to replace the human need to satisfy their violent emotions (Regis, 9).  
In “Michael Crichton y el Techno thriller: de la rebelión de las máquinas al cambio 
climático” (“Michael Crichton and the Techno-Thriller: from the Rebellion of the Machines 
to Climate Change”), Erik Stengler credits Crichton with the creation of the techno thriller, a 
sub-genre exploring the consequences of technologies that lie in the not too distant future 
(especially human dependence on them) and other societal issues (Stengler 2008, 80). 
Crichton, according to Stengler, is a “humanist” concerned with the consequences of 
favoring ideology, utility, or economy over human dignity (90). Westworld, in this analysis, 
is seen as an example of the rebellion of machines against humans, their creators (82). In a 
more recent essay, “Beyond the techno-thriller: Michael Crichton and Societal Issues in 
Science and Technology,” Stengler identifies Westworld, as well as Beyond Westworld, as 
being more specifically concerned with the techno thriller sub-theme of “deception to 
humans” (Stengler 2015, 24).  
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Thomas Vargish mentions Westworld in “Technology and Impotence in Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein,” an essay exploring Shelley’s novel as a tale about how technology 
invariably usurps and empowers humanity’s will simultaneously. Vargish suggests that 
technology is just an extension of the creator’s ego, with all its flaws, although creators 
themselves like Victor Frankenstein tend to deny it. In fact, the troubles resulting from 
technology are nothing but those that would in any case haunt humanity. Frankenstein’s 
creature usurps its creator but is also the result of an act of usurpation over nature on 
behalf of the creator. Creation, Vargish points out, is indeed just an extension, as the 
popular confusion between Frankenstein and the creature himself ironically suggests 
(Vargish, 332). In Vargish’s analysis, Westworld represents “a creation usurping the space, 
the freedom, the power, even the time of its creator” (324). He also emphasizes the 
symbolism of the hand as “the connection between the brain and the environment,” and 
points out how in Westworld the difference between humans and robots consists precisely 
in the imperfection of the robots’ hands (326). 
In “‘More Human than Human’: instrumentalización y sublevación de los sujetos 
artificiales” (“‘More Human than Human’: Manipulation and Rebellion of Artificial 
Subjects”), Jimena Escudero Pérez discusses Westworld in the framework of a lengthy 
analysis of artificial life in movies. Westworld is mentioned as an example of rebellion, but 
Pérez points out as well that the movie leaves unspecified whether the robots stop 
following the program because of a simple anomaly or because they have been deliberately 
counter-programmed by other robots (Escudero Pérez, 81). 
According to Despina Kakoudaki, in “Affect and Machines in the Media,” the motif of 
the creation of sentient beings taps into the archetype of the animation of artificial bodies 
through which, according to notable religious narratives, humanity itself was created. As 
represented by the second edition of Shelley’s Frankenstein (1831), this motif is paired 
with the hubris of humans who want to replicate that act. Artificial beings like 
Frankenstein’s creature symbolize a threat, but also social exclusion and exploitation, and 
question the very notion of humanity (Kakoudaki, 114-115). In light of such observations, 
Kakoudaki sees Westworld as a movie that plays with the distinction between “action” and 
“intention”: “the killing spree may just be the result of a malfunction, but the emotional 
effect follows the classic ‘robot running amok’ theme, which in science fiction literature and 
film is also related to the fear of racial uprising or class warfare” (124). 
In “Androids and the Posthuman in Television and Film,” Kevin LaGrandeur 
identifies two main functions for movie androids: they can be a symbol of technological 
threat or they can be used to explore issues of humanity and personhood. Westworld, 
according to LaGrandeur, is an example of “the threat of irresponsible oversight of 
scientific advances”; its robots start killing the guests “because they are deployed without 
being thoroughly checked for flaws and without adequate failsafe devices in place” 
(LaGrandeur, 9). 
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3.1.1. Discussion 
The most direct, narrative source of fright in the movies and the series at stake is the 
robots’ murderous and relentless actions. Whitlark correctly points out that such robots, 
unlike technological creatures displayed in other movies, do not voice identity concerns, 
philosophical questions about what they are, and the difference or relationship with their 
creators. They are simply “boring” (according to the special meaning Whitlark stipulates) 
and terrifying. But then again, in order to make rational sense of the fact that robots are 
frightening, we have to understand their nature and actions in more detail. Clearly, critics 
who start off by focusing on the robots, in fact end up observing that they either evoke a 
social situation of exploitation and upheaval (Fabozzi, Kozlovic, Stengler, Escudero Pérez), 
or that the problem lies in the kind of technology the robots themselves represent and the 
way it is dealt with by the technicians (Dinello, Vargish, LaGrandeur); some authors make 
both suggestions simultaneously (Höltgen, Kakoudaki). It seems clear then that, to attain a 
sharper interpretation, one has to move beyond the most obvious source of fright – the 
robots’ capacity for relentless violence. 
3.2 Critics advancing a socio-cultural interpretation 
In “Westworld Fantasy and Exploitation” Gerald Mead and Sam Appelbaum identify the 
“dangers of a certain kind of fantasy” and criticism of “the commercial exploitation and the 
technological dependence through which these fantasies and desires are or might be 
gratified,” as Westworld’s “explicit moral perspective,” with a more specific reference to the 
U. S. of the 1970s. They claim that the movie is “confused” and that the solution it offers is 
“at best misleading.” The scenes of the victims and debris collected and reassembled 
overnight are a metaphor of “U.S. technology, backed up by seemingly unlimited economic 
resources” that can erase “acts of cruelty, waste, and destruction.” The contraposition 
between humanness and machines/technology is another main theme identified in the 
movie by Mead and Appelbaum and associated with real-life, present-day concerns. The 
anomalies that distinguish the robots are, according to them, the equivalent of stigmatized 
physical traits in racist ideologies. However, according to their interpretation, Crichton 
does not go deep in his analysis: it stops at the “human/machine distinction” in which 
humans are killed because they were not smart or combative enough. Peter “represents a 
terrified act of self-preservation. His moral lesson is nothing more than a reassuring and 
misleading cover-up of critical and real human prejudices and conflicts.” Crichton stated, in 
fact, that he had fun making the movie and that he hoped audiences would likewise have 
fun.3 Mead and Appelbaum remark that the then young director was expressing “a 
somewhat unreflective consciousness, mystified by its own mystifications” (Mead and 
Applebaum 1975). 
In “Don’t Look Where We’re Going: Visions of the Future in Science-Fiction Films, 
1970-1982,” H. Bruce Franklin describes Westworld and its sequel as belonging to a specific 
sub-genre popular in the seventies, to which also movies like Rollerball (1975), Death Race 
(1975), and Deathsport (1978) belong. Such movies, besides displaying a future society 
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“ruled by some form of conspiracy, monopoly, or totalitarian apparatus” (Franklin 1983, 
72), show that “the most interesting remaining normal human activity is some kind of sport 
or amusement, usually deadly” (73). 
In “Westworld, Futureworld, and the World’s Obscenity,” Jay Paul Telotte interprets 
Westworld and its sequel along a notion of obscenity defined not as “in any display or abuse 
of the body” (unlike the usual definition of the term with its excessively explicit reference 
to sex), “but in the very displayability of all things in the modern world, in their immediate 
openness and vulnerability” (Telotte, 180; italics in the original). Delos’ worlds, he 
continues, “offer a strange mixture of distance and intimacy […]. They seem intended to put 
us back in touch with ourselves, to help us regain a lost, private Self. Yet on another level 
these worlds encourage a kind of retreat from whatever reality they seem to represent: a 
retreat from pain, responsibility, human caring, ultimately from the world we inhabit” 
(181-182). Tourists, he points out, are required to adopt two personalities simultaneously: 
“that of the participant, fully committed to this ‘real’ experience, and that of the observer, 
who stands safely outside this reality, beyond the implications of his involvement, able to 
relish his seemingly irresistible or invulnerable self” (182). Peter, scared and exhausted, 
represents the “collapse” of such a situation: “modern schizophrenia […] leaves one with no 
private space to which to retreat, […] totally vulnerable to the ‘world’s obscenity’” (183). 
According to Telotte, Futureworld “seems to accept [obscenity] as almost a given of modern 
life” (183). The tension between Chuck and Tracy, according to him, is in fact between an 
old-fashioned investigative journalist who doubts reality, and a television newscaster who 
accepts the world as it is: in order to convince Tracy of his suspicions, Chuck has to 
reactivate her “reporter side” (185). All this is related to the cultural and historical context 
in which the movies were produced: the era of the Watergate affair, the spread of 
photocopying machines and videocassette recorders, and of pervasive mass media 
presence (185). He adds that the “simulacrum” (i.e., the copy), is symbolized by the robot, 
but it is a “symptom” rather than a “threat” (186). Science fiction tries to mediate between 
the transformation and the human that is being threatened by the transformation itself, 
“tak[ing] its own schizophrenia in hand”; mediation is most notably represented by 
Futureworld’s Harry Croft, “who lives deep in the bowels of Delos [… (and)] has developed 
‘a taste for the iron’” (187).  
In “Considerations on the Theme Park Model as Short-term Utopia,” Pere Gallardo 
focuses on the concept of theme park, a commodity endorsing and reinforcing the values of 
the capitalistic system. Delos is compared to real parks, Disneyland (California) and Port 
Aventura (Spain), as well as to the well-known fictional resort invented by Crichton, 
Jurassic Park. Theme parks, Gallardo points out, are “short-term utopias, […] provid[ing] a 
condition of happiness different and superior to the world outside” (Gallardo, 19). The 
illusion of happiness relies on the visitors’ suspending their disbelief in reference to 
familiar cultural icons (a movie-like “Western world” being a case in point), and the 
absence of danger (20). A theme park, however, should not (and cannot) aim at autarchy: 
besides not being materially possible (Westworld is located in the desert and depends on 
external supplies), if the visitors decided to stay in the resort for good, its economy would 
collapse (20). Theme parks represent a reconstructed reality (like in the case of 
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ecosystems), or a hypothesized or wished-for one (21), yet the park must be another reality 
excluding the element of risk that characterizes reality outside the park (23). These are 
enclosed, separated, “real and fantastic, historical and a-temporal, rural and urban at the 
same time” (24). Westworld, according to Gallardo, “voices the subterranean conflicting 
forces present in Western societies […] on the eve of the oil crisis.” It is an escapist 
destination for bored upper-middle class individuals; however, “the utopia inside the park 
proves just as frail and overstressing as life outside the park, […] the ending of the film is in 
accordance with the gloomy prospects of the times. […] Westworld can be read as an 
anticipation of the impending socio-economic crisis of the early seventies” (25; italics in the 
original).  
In “Allegories of Post-Fordism in 1970s New Hollywood: Countercultural Combat 
Films, Conspiracy Thrillers as Genre-recycling,” Drehli Robnik analyzes Westworld in the 
context of a critical assessment of Hollywood motifs in the 1970s. He sees the film as an 
example of a trend of the mid- and late-1970s: narrating conspiracies (the park’s control 
system one, and the one on behalf of the killer robots). Westworld is also as an allegory of 
Hollywood’s crisis in the 1970s, with the three artificial worlds respectively representing 
its clichés: Delos is “cinema unable to rid itself of its past” (Robnik, 20). In fact, Robnik’s 
analysis perfectly resonates with Crichton’s observation, according to which “most of the 
situations in the film are clichés; they are incidents out of hundreds of old movies” 
(Crichton 2017, xii). “Compared with Westworld, Futureworld, does nothing else than more 
directly represent the motifs of conspiracy theory and of the “robots out of control” 
(Robnik, 18). 
Larry Alan Busk discusses Crichton’s movie in “Westworld: Ideology, Simulation, 
Spectacle.” Westworld is “a prophetic cultural document evocative of tendencies that were 
only nascent at the time of its publication” (Busk, 2). The movie symbolizes the problems of 
“reality” in the capitalist world and its dialectic with simulation. Delos’ authenticity is 
constantly emphasized, but in fact its three “worlds” are far from representing life in, 
respectively, Imperial Rome, the Middle Ages, and the Old West. Guests are immersed in a 
Hollywood-like caricature where they always occupy a privileged position: they are never 
miners, serfs, farmers, or prostitutes, but cowboys, feudal lords, nobles. The resort is a 
“playground of aggression” in which visitors always end up unharmed and remorseless (5). 
Androids, and actions that would have major legal and moral consequences “outside” are 
commodified, while the forces and processes that sustain the illusion are kept invisible (9). 
Delos is not really a simulation because it “refers to no genuine article” (10; italics in the 
original) and its disaster is not the revelation of the simulation, but the fact that it becomes 
real (15). Busk concludes that “this film is much more than a ‘cautionary tale’ about the 
dangers of technology, and, whatever his intentions, more than a vehicle for Crichton to 
explore ‘chaos theory.’ It is rather an apologue for the multi-faceted ideology that sustains 
our present way of life. We are living in Westworld” (18; italics in the original). 
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3.2.1 Discussion 
A “social” interpretation is quite tempting: the very expression “Western World” or 
“Westworld” points at the very birth of American society. And the “Far West” can be taken 
as the epitome of American society or even of the contemporary “West” tout court. It is also 
telling that one of the ways in which the machines begin their “rebellion” in Westworld is by 
jailing Peter, who has killed the gunslinger for the second time (although, as he claims, in 
self-defense). The robot sheriff states: “There’s a law here now. You can’t go plugging 
whoever you please” (original script, 50). This episode, thus, seemingly brings grist to the 
mill of those critics that the main problem at stake is the irresponsible, unscrupulous 
behavior displayed by visitors to Westworld. The park collapses, like American society/the 
American dream/capitalism, and those who took for granted that they could simply walk 
through it unharmed, and actually exploit it for their own amusement, end up bitterly 
disappointed when not annihilated. 
However, on closer inspection, one notices that socio-cultural interpretations have 
some shortcomings. To be sure, in the original movie the consumerist-capitalist setting is 
strongly evoked (e.g., mentioning the sojourn’s price, and insisting on its escapist nature), 
yet the corporate aspect is not visually and narratively represented at all. The supervisors 
do express concerns about “tourist confidence” but they are rather stereotypical “movie 
scientists” in white, medical-looking coats. We do not witness a board meeting discussing 
financial issues, nor does Delos have an owner.4 Furthermore, we should surely take into 
account that Peter is jailed because of his unethical act, but obviously we cannot fail to see 
either that the killing of tourists and technicians on behalf of the androids is far from 
representing a return to an ethical world. What is more, Peter, who according to the 
“social” reading would be one of the villains, ultimately triumphs over the gunslinger.  
One may also wonder whether the technology of Delos might be harmful only 
insofar as it is subject to sheer capitalistic logic and hence handled irresponsibly or, 
conversely, that technology could not get out of control if handled responsibly; i.e., not just 
aiming at profit above and beyond any other kind of consideration. However, as spectators 
we are simply not provided with enough elements to solve this dilemma.5  
A supplementary problem with the “social” interpretation is that any technology is 
inevitably linked with, stems from, and taps into, a certain social order. A resort like Delos 
can be conceivable only in an individualistic society that is consumer-oriented and in which 
sophisticated technology is not, for example, managed by the state to improve public 
welfare but rather in order to encourage and perform entertainment (a form of absorbing, 
systematic and pervasive amusement that, in its turn, makes one blind to the very real 
mechanisms that rule society). Thus it is very difficult to think of a specific technology and 
of a specific society as two completely separate entities. Furthermore, and perhaps more 
importantly, any way of shaping society is a form of technology broadly conceived as applied 
knowledge; i.e., the application of practical principles, based in their turn on specific 
theoretical assumptions, to the disciplining and managing of a human community. In this 
sense, the line between technology and society becomes irremediably blurred. 
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Opting for a “social” interpretation of Westworld (i.e., describing it as a cautionary 
tale about how society is–currently–structured and managed), is undoubtedly fair; but 
opting exclusively for this kind of interpretation seems more revealing of the critics’ 
political inclinations than respectful of the elements offered by the movie. In other words, if 
we consider Westworld as an allegory of the shortcomings and/or of the collapse of (U.S.) 
capitalism, we still have not explained why technology is a threat. We lose not only the 
relevance of “technophobia” as an explanatory category (the collapse of capitalism could 
have been metaphorically represented in many other ways!) but we also fail to interpret 
plenty of specific elements in the movie while at the same time overstating the actual 
representation of consumerism/capitalism in Westworld.  
In contrast to Westworld, Futureworld emphasizes the capitalist-corporate side from 
the beginning. Mr. Duffy, the character symbolizing it, is explicit about financial figures and 
voices concerns over the resort’s success. However, clear representation does not 
automatically entail clear conceptualization: once again, it remains open whether the threat 
is identified with corporate interests per se, or with malevolent intentions. One is left 
wondering if the Delos corporation is evil or if Mr. Duffy and Dr. Schneider’s plans are evil 
and if, given new security measures, a purely recreational and efficient Delos would be 
possible. 
In Beyond Westworld, corporate interests/capitalism/consumerism seem not to 
constitute a threat: Delos, this time, is intent on containing the damage caused by the evil 
Dr. Quaid, as well as on developing useful robots. The first episode indeed shows that 
androids are being employed for useful, non-recreational activities (“to take over 
dangerous jobs”). In the fifth episode, Dr. Quaid is experimenting not only with robots but 
with human-controlling chips, and Delos prevents him from replacing a prominent 
politician with an android. Delos rushes to rescue the establishment, the political status 
quo: exactly the opposite of what it was doing in Futureworld.  
3.3 Critics focusing on technicians and scientists  
In “Dinosaur Doctors and Jurassic Geniuses,” Gary Hoppenstand mentions Westworld in a 
comparison between the figure of the scientist in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Lost World 
(1912) and Crichton’s Jurassic Park. Although he does not expand on the movie, he 
identifies a dialectic in Crichton’s novels that can also be useful for the present analysis 
(Hoppenstand, 4). He points out that technology is depicted, in the 1990 novel, as “a very 
dangerous thing indeed, […] something that, if not responsibly handled, […] will destroy 
humanity” where the lack of responsibility overlaps with the capitalistic/imperialistic 
ideology and attitude. This is represented by the owner of the park, millionaire John 
Hammond (associated with scientist Wu), whereas responsibility is embodied by Ian 
Malcolm, the black-dressed scientist (and in fact an avatar of Crichton himself, according to 
Hoppenstand) who has a theory that “predicts unpredictability” (11-12), most notably 
nature’s.  
Bigliardi: Technophobia in Westworld 
 
Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy  Vol. 2: 2019 
 
12 
 
In “As múltiplas imagens do cientista no cinema” (“The Multiple Images of Scientists 
in Cinema”), Lacy Barca examines, from a historical perspective, how scientists have been 
represented in movies, pointing out that such representation is actually influential over 
society (for instance, its influence on children’s perception of science). Westworld is 
mentioned as an example of a movie in which scientists are represented, in critical fashion, 
as the mere instrument of greater forces, such as a government or army and, in this case 
(although Barca does not use the term), the market, since they are supposed and expected 
only to keep the park going by providing satisfaction to its guests (Barca, 35). 
3.3.1 Discussion 
The problem with the supervisors and the technicians in Westworld is that they are far 
from constituting a homogeneous group. At least one supervisor does show signs of 
awareness and represents critical, responsible behavior. In fact, in the script he is 
described as “scholarly-looking” (38) and he is indicated as “the first” and “our” supervisor. 
In order to grasp the conceptual difficulties posed by the supervisors and 
technicians in Westworld, let us add some instruments to our critical toolbox, taking into 
account another notable scholarly analysis. Peter Weingart, Claudia Muhl, and Petra 
Pansegrau examine a significant selection of movies (two hundred and twenty two of them) 
in the attempt to identify the images of science and scientists they convey. They point out 
that “scientific knowledge and its technological applications” are characterized by an 
intrinsic symbolic ambiguity, “having been associated with both liberation and domination, 
with the power to control and the threat of being controlled, with human welfare and 
destruction since antiquity” (Weingart, Muhl, and Pansegrau, 280). They observe as well 
that “the depiction of science reveals the fundamental uneasiness, distrust, and even 
mystification of science on the part of the moviemakers that must in some way reflect the 
sentiments of the crowds that watch their products” (281). Although they warn that “the 
entire number of films showing scientists or science is unknown” (282), they find that, in 
the movies they analyzed, scientists are mainly medical doctors, followed by physicists and 
chemists. Moreover, the typical scientist is white, American, male and middle aged (282). 
Concerning the scientists’ psychological profiles, the authors identify three main 
stereotypes: “benevolent” scientists, who are naïve but whose discoveries are put to bad 
use by superior powers; “ambivalent,” when they are idealistic but easily corrupted; and 
finally the “mad scientists,” who are from the beginning marked by ambition and hubris. 
However, the majority of the movies analyzed displays benevolent ones (283). 
Furthermore, “dangerous” research is represented as happening outside official/public 
institutions (284).6  
The three authors’ analysis does not touch upon Westworld, but it provides a 
taxonomy that we can try to apply to it and, most notably, to the “good” supervisor. Such a 
character seems to anticipate the “critical/scientific consciousness” embodied in Jurassic 
Park by Dr. Malcolm, as the aforementioned Hoppenstand points out. If we refer to the 
three scholars’ typology, it is difficult to describe this supervisor as “benevolent”; he is 
definitely not “mad,” nor are the other ones. Nor does he qualify as “ambiguous”; he is 
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simply overruled by the majority of his colleagues, who seem more unconvinced than profit 
driven about his model. Once more, we find ourselves left with a question of the chicken-
and-egg kind: whether the colleagues would be more open-minded and receptive, or more 
skeptical towards the park’s technological functionality, if the park’s financial functionality 
was not at stake.  
Furthermore, in a scene present only in the original script, two technicians are 
aware of what is going on ahead of the supervisors: “Damned supervisors don’t even know 
what’s happening” and “Well, they don’t have to do the work, just walk around and give 
orders. They got their heads in the clouds” (original script 41). However, those very 
technicians do not embody pure, lucid, unstained consciousness either. In fact, in another 
deleted scene, one of them boasts about having had sex with one of the machines (original 
script, 42), displaying the tourists’ same hedonistic attitude. Moreover, the technician who 
is attempting to flee Delos, right before being killed by the gunslinger, forgets the danger 
and, “oddly enthusiastic, almost delighted,” is carried away by the technical description of 
the robot: “Excellent machine. […] Beautiful machines, so elegant. […] [It] has a new 
integration unit, amazing little thing. […] The best scientific brains in the world built that 
machine, and they did a good job” (original script 85-86).  
Futureworld does not draw a precise line between scientists-technicians and 
corporate executives, nor between humanity and technology, nor between good and evil. 
“Evil” characters (Mr. Duffy and Dr. Schneider) share the same plan and they both turn out 
to be machines, and at least one technician (Harry) is a positive figure. Given how confused 
their representation is, let us postpone any discussion of them until the next section, after 
introducing the motif of technology. 
Beyond Westworld does focus on the actions of a mad scientist. What is presented as 
harmful and threatening in Beyond Westworld is Dr. Quaid’s ideology that gradually 
emerges through his speeches. However, interestingly (and confusingly), such ideology 
seems to stem from moralistic and humanistic concerns. Dr. Quaid in fact complains that 
robots in Westworld had been turned into toys “to fulfill superficial pleasures” and claims 
that his dream is “to develop a harmonious society with perfectly programmed robots in 
charge,” a “world free of war, hunger, and sickness,” “a society free of all personal 
responsibilities and obligations.” Dr. Quaid is the villain and systematically ends up 
defeated. However, that he is not completely wrong in his complaint about the purely 
recreational usage of technology is seemingly demonstrated by the fact that Delos is now 
engaged in the development of useful robots. Furthermore, in the first episode, he claims 
that “the world’s values are obscene” and adds, “Tell me one thing that money can’t buy.” 
When accused by Moore of being like Mussolini, he replies that he is “no egoholic” and that 
he does not care whether his name will become known. Yet he adds that he created “an 
impregnable army of loyal and unquestioning troops.” In the second episode, he confides 
that while working in Westworld he was “under the delusion that science, not money, was 
humanity’s first priority” and insists that he “did not exploit man’s meaner nature by 
amusing him with playthings that could serve humanity.” In the third episode, Dr. Quaid 
tries to collaborate with a North African general (in fact manipulating him) and in the final 
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episode he states, “If we can control the human emotions, we can make man into the 
perfect species he should have been.” We are left wondering what is exactly evil and wrong: 
Dr. Quaid’s individualism? The attempt at manipulating human nature which, although 
flawed (Dr. Quaid himself is a human, ultimately), should not be changed? Is it conformism 
as represented by Dr. Quaid’s social plan? Or rather the fact that his seemingly 
humanitarian utopia is in fact an egoholic’s dream of authoritarianism?  
3.4 Critics focusing on technology and its contraposition with nature/humanity 
In “Images of Technology in Popular Films,” Steven L. Goldman analyzes the depiction of 
science and technology in popular movies from 1925 onwards, and points out a paradox: 
despite the association of science with progress and well-being, and massive public 
investments, science is constantly negatively represented (Goldman, 275-276). A powerful 
cliché is that of the scientists’ powerlessness vis-à-vis “corporate, political, or military 
institutions” (276). Technology is usually represented as “anti-human” (277). Science is 
often represented as either “corrupted by the manner in which it is exploited” or 
“intrinsically corrosive of human well-being” (286). Goldman posits an interesting 
question: What could be the source of this ambivalent depiction of technology, especially 
given that movie directors themselves can be “techno-freaks”? (His example is George 
Lucas, who contraposes the “Force” to technology in Star Wars). He concludes that it can be 
the outcome both of personal biases and of public attitudes. Such attitudes are identified 
with a “widespread anxiety” over science and of technology’s social impact. Goldman 
specifies: “This anxiety may be partially relieved by seeing the ‘dark’ sides of science and 
technology worked out on the movie screen, perhaps in the hope that that is where they 
will remain, but the anxiety seems to be a permanent condition of modernity” (288). He 
distinguishes three “foci” of such anxiety: technology “inevitably leads beyond humanity’s 
best interests”; public interest is overwhelmed by the concentration of science and 
technology in the hands of a corporation or government; and technological progress 
ultimately cannot improve the human condition (288-289). In Goldman’s analysis, Crichton 
is the typical author and director who focuses on the limitations of technology and both 
Westworld and Futureworld are briefly mentioned as examples of this theme (288, 292, and 
298).  
Nico Reiher is the author of a short seminar paper, “Anti-Technological Ideas in 
Michael Crichton’s Westworld,” in which the movie is described as generically conveying an 
“anti-technology” message. However, Reiher’s reflections are worth a mention since he 
points out how, paradoxically, the most sophisticated technology is employed in Delos to 
recreate a world in which that very technology was unthinkable and to realize the dream of 
living in a technology-free world (Reiher, 2). 
3.4.1 Discussion  
In the original script, Delos is advertised as “the triumph of man’s mastery over the 
environment” and the gunslinger is destroyed on a rack. Crichton writes, “We deleted the 
final fight between [Peter] Martin and the gunslinger. We tried it, but it seemed stagey and 
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foolish, so we elected to drop it entirely. I had liked the idea of a complex machine being 
destroyed by a simple machine, the rack, but otherwise I didn’t miss the lost sequence” 
(Crichton 2017, xix; my emphasis). So perhaps the problem posed by the technology 
represented by Westworld robots is that they are unnaturally too complicated, 
characterized by a complexity that is opposed to “natural” simplicity and gets easily out of 
hand, but also one that is still vulnerable to natural human instinct and creativity, as well as 
to more elementary forms of technology. This interpretation would respect the clearly 
displayed fact that the situation does spin out of control, and disastrously so, but ultimately 
one human is able to save his skin. 
However, upon closer inspection this dichotomy also turns out to be far from rigid, 
resulting in an unsolvable oscillation between the two concepts. Remember that when the 
aforementioned “good” supervisor is struggling to understand the situation, he points out, 
“We aren’t dealing with ordinary machines here. These are highly complicated pieces of 
equipment, almost as complicated as living organisms. […] Why shouldn’t they be 
vulnerable to, let us say, an infectious disease?” (original script 43). One is thus left 
wondering if “ordinary” (less complex machines) would ever develop the same glitch. 
Furthermore, the very comparison of the glitch and its diffusion to a “disease” strongly 
suggest that the problem lies precisely in the fact that Westworld machines have started 
replicating natural complexity, not to mention the very fact that, ultimately, the presence of 
a pattern may entail predictability and the problem is rather that most of the scientists are 
blind to it.7  
It is also strongly suggested (visually, at least) that the machines are resentful and 
look for revenge; i.e., they have started replicating typical human feelings. Whose revenge 
is this? Perhaps nature’s revenge for human usurpation–a retaliation that nature 
accomplishes through the machines that it “hijacks” in the form of a “disease.” However, the 
very idea of nature looking for vengeance entails a personification of nature. Personifying 
nature is perfectly fine for an interpretive move (and a narrative one that Crichton did 
explore, most notably in Jurassic Park). However, this implies that technology is fearful 
insofar as it takes on the sentiments and irrationality typical of human beings and not per 
se as something completely different and separate from humanity and nature. Thus, 
paradoxically, technophobia would turn out not to be fear of some quality or threat 
intrinsic to machines.  
We may consider the whole disaster as the robots’ revenge without bringing nature 
into the picture. But then we are led to think that the robots, once they have acquired 
human/natural traits, must be resentful for a reason, and the reason could be nothing else 
but that they have been brutally exploited. Thus we are back to the “social” interpretation. 
Nor is “nature” completely eliminable from this kind of explanation, since obviously the 
acquisition of feelings on behalf of machines is a shift to humanity, a return to what is 
“natural.” 
Technology in Futureworld is verbally conceptualized through Dr. Schneider’s 
statements. He seems to identify the machines with perfection and to oppose them to 
human imperfection. When Chuck and Tracy find out that the technicians are robots (after 
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Tracy’s failed attempt at seducing one), he states, “We discovered that one of the causes for 
our disaster with Westworld lay with the human flaws of our controllers. So we replaced 
them with these. The model 700 technician series. They have no ego. So, they have no hang-
ups. And thus, one more source of error is eliminated.” Later the reporters recognize each 
other through something that “cannot be faked”: a passionate kiss. And yet the 
contraposition machine/human, perfection/imperfection, and fake/authentic are, in 
Futureworld, ultimately blurry.  
To begin with, the machines in this movie do have an ego. They have their own plan 
aimed at self-affirmation and conservation, a plan that, surprisingly, even carries 
environmentalist undertones. Mr. Duffy (a machine) states: “The human being is a very 
unstable, irrational, violent animal. Now, hold it. All our probability studies indicate that if 
left alone, you’ll destroy much of this planet before the end of the decade. Now, we at Delos 
are determined to see that doesn’t happen. We don’t intend to be destroyed by your 
mistakes.”  
Furthermore, technology is represented as “perfect” rather in the sense that it 
creates a perfect copy of a human being, not a truly flawless machine. Chuck and Tracy’s 
replicas claim that they have the same virtues as well as the same shortcomings as the 
originals. Tracy’s one says, “It’s a good thing father taught us how to shoot, isn’t it?” and 
Chuck’s one, “We’re both lousy shots. Remember Sergeant Rucker at basic? Browning, you 
couldn’t hit an elephant in the ass at five yards with a bazooka. Be careful, brother.” He 
adds, “Don’t forget we’re afraid of heights.” What then is different and/or superior about 
machines indistinguishable from, and hence as flawed as, their originals, and that 
ultimately end up defeated? 
The borders separating “metal-and-circuits” technology and biology become even 
more ambiguous when the plan is completely unveiled. Mr. Duffy states, “Look, don’t 
imagine that these duplicates we’ve created are mere robots. They are not machines. They 
are living beings produced by the genetic information in your own cells. There are no 
mechanical parts. Even those of us who create them can’t tell the original from the 
duplicate.” Crucially, Mr. Duffy is also revealed to be a machine. It is unclear whether there 
has ever been an original, true and human Mr. Duffy or if he has always and only existed in 
the form of an android. Be this as it may, this provokes a conceptual collapse and leads us 
to ask whether the culprit is the machine being opposed to what is human and natural.  
As I have just explained, Duffy and Schneider respectively represent corporate 
interests and technology in a negative, human-threatening fashion. Their very cooperation, 
and the suspicion that even Dr. Schneider himself may be a machine (another idea that is 
only vaguely suggested, but not unlikely at all), makes them overlapping and ambiguous. 
Yet another couple is likewise ambiguous and overlapping, although acting in the story in a 
positive fashion; i.e., friendly towards the movie’s heroes: Harry and Clark. They introduce 
comic/pathetic motifs, but also, on close inspection, further elements of confusion.  
Clark is a robot. His humanity is visually (and powerfully) negated by the absence of 
a face. All we see instead of familiar facial features is a hole, protected by a glass or plastic 
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screen, with circuitry and lights inside. Harry explains: “I kind of got tired of taking it off 
every time I had to fix him.” It is important to remark that in both Westworld and 
Futureworld the removal or loss of a robot’s face is a visual and narrative device that marks 
the moments in which machines are either powerless (under repair) or defeated, and in 
any case fully exposed as android, non-human. It is not an accident that “losing the face” is 
the last thing that happens to Westworld’s gunslinger right before collapsing and, in 
Futureworld, the removal of Chuck’s face emphasizes the revelation that Mr. Duffy is a 
robot. Yet this one faceless machine has a human name. A name, though, reminiscent of a 
human being with enhanced capacities. Harry explains, “You know, from Superman, Clark 
Kent, man of steel.” Clark engages in typically human activities, such as playing cards, 
perhaps even cheating. And when Harry is about to leave him, Clark covers his “non-face” 
in a typically human expression of sadness.  
Harry is likewise a puzzling character. He lives across worlds. As correctly intuited 
by Jay Telotte, like the “tricksters” of mythological traditions he belongs to the “gods” that 
steer Delos (he is a technician), but he is also a fifth-columnist of sorts, living 
(parasitically?) underground, escaping surveillance, disobeying Dr. Schneider’s directives, 
and revolting against the system. He rescues the heroes because he dislikes seeing them in 
trouble, he claims. His vanity and childlike feelings are easily played with: upon being 
informed that Tracy is a reporter, and that she enjoys a huge audience (including people in 
Cleveland, where his mother lives), he immediately accepts to be interviewed. Yet Harry 
also states that he developed a “taste for iron,” being more used to machines than humans. 
At the moment of leaving Clark, he engages in a pathetic speech that blends sociopathic 
tones with affectionate and almost homoerotic ones: “You know I’d take you with me, don’t 
you? You know that. It just... It wouldn’t work out. I mean, people on the outside, they just... 
they never would understand how it is with us.” Suddenly he changes his mind: “The hell 
with them. When we get this thing straightened out, I’ll be back to get you. Don’t worry 
about that. Don’t worry about it. You’ve been a good pal to me. I’m gonna sure miss you. 
Watch out for the bad circuit in your arm, you hear? You got to be careful now. So long, you 
ol’ bag of bolts. We’ll see you.” 
If machines are human, all-too-human, and if a human with a taste for iron 
humanizes machines and sympathizes with humans, is technology the real threat? Is it the 
misled use of it? In sum, Futureworld amplifies the seminal motifs of Westworld and hence 
its conceptual problems that are ultimately left unresolved.  
In the first episode of Beyond Westworld, the robot that Moore is chasing is 
“absolutely perfect, undetectable.” Technology was created by “some of the most highly 
trained experts in the world.” The “simple-machine-destroying-a-complex-machine” 
archetype, that (as in Westworld) in Crichton’s intentions was represented in the 
destruction of the gunslinger on a rack, is found in the last episode, “Takeover” (1980), in 
which a policeman android is destroyed with a forklift.8 However, the aforementioned 
contrapositions turn out to be explanatorily unsatisfactory. Once again, we see that 
technology is so complex as to become natural. In the first episode we are told that 
androids are “almost as complicated as living organisms. […] So complex that their circuitry 
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had to be worked out by other computers. That’s what makes them so incredibly real.” And, 
once again, confusingly, the machines’ perfection does not prevent them from having some 
flaws that ultimately make them vulnerable. Technology per se, in Beyond Westworld, is 
neither good nor bad. Technological devices are used to detect robots. “Good” Professor 
Oppenheimer masters (and hence embodies) technology as much as “bad” Dr. Quaid does.  
4. What if there is no consistent philosophical message? 
The attempt to pinpoint only one specific concept or conceptual dichotomy, linked in its 
turn to one narrative element as the key to interpreting a science fiction story (i.e., 
character, situation, symbol, speech), while discarding or ignoring other elements, is 
warranted by the fact that most such stories are rich and multilayered. However, the 
specific concepts proposed by different critics have turned out to be too limited. They leave 
uncovered too wide a portion of the narrative and they do not fully connect the three 
narratives; upon scrutiny, each such concept or dichotomy turns out to be unsatisfactory, 
inevitably referring, as it does, to other concepts which in their turn are likewise 
problematic. In some cases, one even ends up running in circles. We may take a 
deflationary stance, giving up on the explanatory project altogether or significantly 
reducing its ambition. Perhaps Michael Crichton was sincere and accurate when he stated, 
“Westworld was not intended to be profound. Neither was it intended to be stupid, but our 
clear goal was entertainment” (Crichton 2017, xix). Westworld, we may well say taking such 
words at face value, is hopelessly vague and open-ended as far as its storyline is concerned. 
It is ultimately a juvenile creation and its egregious flaws were not corrected in the sequel 
and in the series.  
We should not, however, necessarily assume negligence on behalf of the director. 
Some notable “holes” may have been caused by choices that resulted from budgetary 
constraints or even from Crichton’s aesthetic preferences. Take the fact, previously 
observed, that no board members of Delos are ever displayed in Westworld, but just 
scientists and technicians. This may simply have been due to the impossibility of hiring 
additional actors for more characters, or perhaps the director wanted to be narratively 
parsimonious; that is, he wanted to avoid cluttering the tale with further characters, 
dialogues, and situations.  
There are also blatant logical holes in the narratives. For instance, it is not explained 
how the guests of Westworld are protected from ricochets or wounds inflicted with blades 
or in brawls, nor why robots are equipped with real guns, nor why robot horses do not 
malfunction, etc. Similar problems affect Futureworld and Beyond Westworld. In the former, 
for instance, hostile samurai robots materialize similarly to teleportation in Star Trek 
without any explanation being offered for such an event. Beyond Westworld leaves it 
completely unclear why Dr. Quaid is really a threat to the world, given the modesty of his 
means, and why Delos does not try to defeat him even more vigorously with governmental 
or military assistance, and so on.  
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Perhaps, therefore, we are simply looking for philosophical meaning where there is 
none or with insufficient elements to warrant a unified and consistent philosophical 
reading, be it of single narratives or all the narratives taken as a whole. We may thus be 
content with saying that none of the narratives examined conveys a clear system of ideas. 
In line with such a deflationary interpretation, we may even claim that any expression of 
technophobia does not hold (much) philosophical value if it is based on an excessively fictional 
and/or a (scientifically or logically) flawed representation of technology. If conveyed through 
a narrative of this kind, technophobia either loses its philosophical significance or it boils 
down to the expression of a non-structured, irrational fear. This, however, sounds extreme 
and destructive. A more benign or moderate variant of such deflationary stance may 
consist of claiming that one can still philosophically deal with incomplete narratives. One 
may think that the narratives discussed here were intentionally designed as incomplete in 
order to create a Kafkaesque, nightmarish effect on the audience and/or to encourage an 
interactive, interpretive engagement with them. In this sense, sticking to a deflationary 
interpretation does not mean denying any philosophical import to the movies and series. If 
one wanted to discuss the movies and the series, for instance, in a college course on 
technophobia, Westworld’s could be presented as being (mostly) about the fear of highly 
complex technology going chaotically and catastrophically wrong. Futureworld may be 
used to discuss the fear that the machines decide that humanity is not doing a good job and 
consequently set out to take over. Beyond Westworld can be seen as addressing 
technology’s possibilities for evil, particularly in the hands of a self-righteous fanatic with 
an enormous capacity for rationalizing destructive, self-aggrandizing schemes. But then 
again all such fears would turn out to be conceptually problematic as well as imperfectly 
instantiated in the narratives. In other words, the movies and series would still be regarded 
as thought-provoking material but their expression of technophobia would be regarded as 
sketchy, or fragmentary, or circular. We could consider them as inspiring at best, but not 
fully instructive.  
Sticking to a moderately deflationary interpretation also saves the appreciation of 
the movies’ and series’ aesthetic differences, which are, in fact, quite obvious. It seems safe 
to state that Westworld, on the whole, is narratively more efficient; i.e., it is more appealing 
and entertaining than Futureworld and Beyond Westworld. The reason lies, I think, in its 
groundbreaking character, its many motifs and narrative devices,9 as well as its rhythm and 
visual appeal. In all likelihood, if Crichton’s Westworld were not the entertaining machine it 
is, we would not be wondering about its philosophical relevance either. The sequel and the 
series can be considered as containing an increase in conceptual confusion that is not 
compensated by original ideas, rhythm, and narrative. Purely considered as tales, they are 
rather clumsy. 
The moderately deflationary stance, however, is still unsatisfactory. In particular, it 
does not respect the spirit of Dinello’s investigation and reflection. He suggests that science 
fiction conveys not only feelings about problems, but also tactics to deal with problems: 
insofar as one identifies only a partial explanation or theory, or falls back on a circular, 
open-ended concept, no feasible tactics or teaching can be inferred from the narrative. 
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5. Technophobia and de-theologized, epistemic hubris 
Here is another, more philosophical and more explanatorily powerful option. We can 
connect technophobia with the concept of hubris. The classical definition of hubris (as 
widely instantiated in Greek mythology, epic, and tragedy) is that of an attitude of excessive 
pride towards the gods and/or the attempt at mimicking their actions and privileges, an 
excess of self-confidence that results in, and is punished through, a state of blindness that 
ultimately leads to a catastrophe.10 The myth of Icarus, who tried to fly with wings of wax 
and feathers, is a case in point; such a myth is related to the improper and overly 
enthusiastic use of technology and its ensuing failure. Icarus flew too close to the sun 
(identified with the god Apollo), and the wax of his wings melted, causing him to fall into 
the sea. 
However, hubris thus defined is still too rough and vague to do the work. Let us 
refine its definition to mean blindness towards one’s own limitations or, more precisely, 
one’s epistemic limitations; i.e., the limitations of one’s understanding and knowledge of 
reality, invariably and irremediably resulting in severe limitations for (a) one’s ability to 
devise models of reality and (b) one’s actions in reality based on such models.11 No one can 
enjoy total and absolute knowledge of reality; hence, no one can keep reality under total 
and absolute control. Those who fail to recognize this end up frustrated and defeated. The 
ruin of their plans brings about the ruin of the subjects themselves, including serious 
injuries and death. Westworld, Futureworld, and Beyond Westworld can be regarded as 
hubris-related dramas. The drama does not consist of the wounds, the damage, the 
casualties, the financial catastrophes, the technical failures, the frustrated ambitions, or any 
other woeful situation. The real drama of Westworld, as well as of its sequel and of the 
offshoot series, is that no one understands how little they understand (including self-
understanding), and everyone acts as if they understand enough to warrant total control of 
reality. In order to fully elucidate this interpretation, however, we must further define 
hubris, carefully specifying five points. 
First, the concept of limitation has to be understood as epistemic. In other words, we 
are referring to each and every subject’s ultimate incapacity to fully grasp any element or 
portion of reality (let alone reality as a whole). We are not referring to the intrinsic 
intractability of reality as ultimately ungraspable and uncontrollable. (This, however, was a 
topic dear to Crichton and one which I will come to shortly.) 
Second, all sentient subjects, regardless of their nature (be it biological, mechanical, 
or mixed) qua sentient beings are concerned with, and characterized by, such limitations. 
As a result, they all similarly undergo the consequences of ignoring them. Westworld 
humans (techno-scientists, as well as guests) entertain the illusion that they understand 
the park to the point that they can totally control and steer it, or enjoy it without any 
worries and restraints whatsoever. Westworld androids embody the illusion of a total 
takeover based on their superior capacities, cognitive as well as physical. Analogous 
observations hold for Futureworld humans and androids, as well as for Delos and Dr. Quaid 
in the series. Each party is convinced that it can completely understand and control the 
other one and fully take over the environment they inhabit. Because of this elucidation, the 
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machine/humanity dichotomy (as well as creator/creation and nature/artificiality) loses 
explanatory relevance in these particular movies.  
Third, hubris classically defined involved arrogance, pride, elation, and 
stubbornness as emotional components. To be sure, some characters instantiating hubris 
do display this kind of attitude and feeling: think about the enthusiasm and self-
complacency characterizing Westworld technicians, Mr. Duffy, Dr. Quaid, but also Chuck’s 
and Tracy’s replicas. However, hubris as I am defining it here does not necessarily entail 
(nor, conversely, is it univocally detected by the presence of) such emotions. Eliminating 
the emotional component from the concept of hubris allows the extension of such concept 
to a character like the gunslinger, that is in fact emotionless (remember Whitlark’s concept 
of “boredom”). In other words, hubris here is merely identified with the mismatch between 
one’s self-estimation and one’s actual capacities.  
In the fourth place, it is crucial to grasp that hubris does not consist solely of the 
attempt at understanding reality, nor solely of the attempt to control reality, but rather 
from the combined illusion that one can totally understand reality and therefore exert total 
control over it. We will explore the consequences of this distinction after a final remark 
about hubris.  
Finally, but not less importantly, with the proposed refinement of the concept of 
hubris in opposition to the “classical” one, I am also dropping reference to any divine 
agency (or, for that matter, of any agency intrinsically superior to the one committing the 
act of hubris). Hubris here discussed brings about disaster automatically. No “jealous god” 
(nor any other “offended” agency) need be involved in the picture. In fact, one may wonder 
whether the presence of divine agency in ancient Greek, hubris-related narratives was just 
metaphorical (i.e., it may have been a merely mythological shell for a secular conception of 
self-blind, arrogant obstinacy as automatic catastrophe-bearer). Conversely, one may 
wonder if it has to be regarded as a constant (even if occasionally implicit) aspect in the 
narrative (i.e., the gods are there even when they are not overtly mentioned; for example, 
that Icarus simply flew too close to the sun, and the natural result was the wax melting; 
however, the sun can be taken as a symbol and an instantiation of Apollo). This discussion 
would lead us far beyond the scope of the present paper. Suffice it to say that the definition 
of hubris here employed is completely “secularized,” and hence conceptually parsimonious 
as well as respectful of the movie narratives examined. In fact, it is very difficult to see 
which characters would implicitly or metaphorically represent the “gods” (unless we 
interpret the humans as such). More in general, at least in the original movie, it is quite 
difficult to identify a veritable “winner” or “punisher” or “loser.” The robots initially 
“punish” humans and “win” over many individuals but they do not triumph. Peter does 
“win” as an individual, but definitely not as a representative of tourists/humanity. There is 
in Westworld, Futureworld, and Beyond Westworld no clearly identifiable, general “offence” 
brought on someone, nor an omnipotent “offended agent” administrating a punishment in 
retaliation.  
The adoption of such a “de-theologized” concept either entails dropping the moral 
side to the hubris-related teaching or relying on a “secular” notion of morality. We can 
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claim that what the narratives suggest is simply that the different agents cause their own 
ruin as a result of disregarding their limitations—something that is represented as a purely 
mechanical phenomenon or process, without moralistic undertones. To put it even more 
simply, the movies and the series are not “tales of punishment,” but reports about chains of 
causes and effects. Alternatively, we can interpret hubris as a moral flaw and all of its 
negative effects (overreaching, acting out of turn or of proportion, jumping to conclusions, 
etc.) as a form of punishment. To be sure, a “virtuous agent,” i.e. a character acting much 
differently, is missing in the two movies.  
Let me once more stress that all sentient agents in the movies and the series are 
characterized by, and thus become victims of hubris thus defined; hence, they all end up, in 
a sense, defeated. If spectators ever witness a victory, such victory is always temporary and 
meant to emphasize the losing party’s limitations rather than meant to signify a total 
triumph on behalf of those characters who are prevailing. Peter survives the disaster of 
Delos, but he is frustrated in his plans to have unrestrained leisure in a hyper-
technological, totally controlled environment, and to find there a safe, radical alternative to 
his daily routine (not to mention, the shock and the loss of his friend). Similar 
considerations hold for Chuck and Tracy. They may triumph as reporters, yet the whole 
story marks the failure of humanity, to which they belong, at the apex of its technological 
development as symbolized by the creation of supposedly perfect replicas of humans, as 
well as of a machine that can read human thoughts. Such achievements turn out to be as 
harmful as they are wonderful. Chuck and Tracy can defeat their replicas only by becoming 
aware of their own shortcomings as individuals. Artificial beings are likewise too self-
confident. The robots’ faculties in Westworld are extremely enhanced and superior to 
human ones, but they can still be defeated by human instinct and creativity, as Peter’s trick 
with the acid shows. The technician who tries to flee Delos on a golf cart, a character that 
has not come under critical scrutiny, can be said to be overconfident in his own escape plan 
(relying on technology—the small vehicle), but also to be overconfident in the androids’ 
faculties that he talks about almost euphorically, fatally forgetting the danger. He is a 
marginal character but an interesting one, embodying what we may call “multiple” or 
“mixed” (and hence contradictory) hubris. He acts across worlds similarly to Futureworld’s 
Harry Croft, and he is a “losing trickster” of sorts, given that he provides Peter with advice 
that proves crucial (although the technician does not believe it will work out) but he also 
ends up being murdered. In Futureworld, the robots’ perfection is such that it turns into its 
opposite: human flawedness. Finally, as we have seen, hubris in Beyond Westworld is 
mainly embodied by Dr. Quaid, who regularly succumbs to his adversaries at the end of 
each episode. But Delos, although its agents triumph, is simultaneously also losing. In fact, 
the whole series is about the aftermath of a large-scale failure. The villain is nothing but an 
offshoot of Delos itself (he employs the same technology) and the good heroes are intent on 
containing the damage.  
Among the critics whose positions I have outlined and discussed, only two seem to 
come fairly close to the concept of hubris that I am delineating. Thomas Vargish 
(“Technology and Impotence in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein”) goes so far as to point out 
that the creatures’ limitations are the creator’s ones. However, he seems to focus on 
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material limitations, or material flaws, rather than on epistemic ones. Emphasis is still on 
the mechanical malfunctions rather than on the epistemic equipment. Or, at best, since he 
employs the term “ego,” he can be considered as emphasizing some kind of psychological or 
emotional flaw that is transmitted from creator to creature. Despina Kakoudaki (“Affect 
and Machines in the Media”) employs the very term “hubris,” but her discussion still falls 
back on a theological characterization: she refers to humanity as trying to replicate the 
gods’ creation of humanity itself and being punished accordingly. Although the creation of 
androids (i.e., etymologically, the “ones resembling men/humans”) is thematically central 
in the movies and the series, we cannot say that all androids and exclusively the androids 
convey technophobia: there are some nice or good ones (most notably, Clark in 
Futureworld), and dreadful technology is instantiated as well by other inventions, such as 
the mind-reading device of Futureworld. In sum, both Vargish’s and Kakoudaki’s 
interpretations significantly advance towards the concept of hubris here proposed but still 
too sketchily so.  
One important implication of the interpretation I am offering is that “technophobia” 
as Dinello uses it still holds valid as a descriptive, critical/literary category, as well as a 
psychological one, but it also turns out to be quite imperfect, philosophically speaking, 
although not in the sense that it is revealed to be an irrational fear. In other words, there 
are good reasons to side with Dinello and appreciate his work, finding that the different 
examples of technophobia he identifies are well-instantiated. Furthermore, we discover 
that there are very good reasons to feel fear, aversion, and suspicion towards technology. 
However, fearing technology turns out to be meaningful and justified, or philosophically 
productive, only if one realizes that the limitations of technology are nothing but the 
consequence of its creation and usage on behalf of epistemically limited humanity (or 
artificial minds) and that ultimately the real threat stems from overconfidence in one’s 
capacities to devise a perfect technology, or in technology as disclosing unlimited power 
and opportunities, or in underestimating the potential threats or negative uses of a 
particular technology. Feeling technophobia, and identifying a narrative as technophobic is 
fully useful and pedagogical only if one realizes that technophobia itself is a stepping-stone 
to understanding the concept of epistemic hubris and avoiding it.  
A possible negative consequence of explaining technophobia through hubris the 
way I am suggesting here is that it yields an utterly gloomy, pessimistic picture of humanity 
and its actions. Are we supposed to give up entirely on technology—or for that matter, on 
the very attempt at understanding ourselves and reality? One should be careful not to over 
interpret. Technology (i.e., its development and usage) and hubris are not one and the same 
thing. Fear is not automatically and necessarily associated with technology, nor is threat. 
Once again, the key to understanding this point is going back to the movies and series. 
Consider that technophobia is narratively conveyed by showing certain technology-related 
circumstances, not by displaying technology per se. To be sure, the narratives as a whole are 
technophobic, and technophobia characterizes their most thrilling moments, but there are 
as well moments of genuine amusement and amazement conveyed by the technology they 
display. Technology and, more generally, knowledge, are also used effectively to counter 
threats and contain damage, including those caused by technology itself. Such is the case of 
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the knowledge and tools used by Peter to confront the gunslinger (but also, even before the 
breathtaking “manhunt,” of the explosive used to free him from jail), of the rifle used by 
Tracy against her replica, of the devices used by John Moore to detect Quaid’s androids. 
And let us not forget that androids are used in Beyond Westworld to perform dangerous 
work.  
It is thus crucial to go back to, and emphasize, the fourth element of the definition of 
hubris mentioned above. I am not using Crichton’s movie, its sequel, and the series as a 
propaedeutic to some form of irrationalism, total pessimism, nor am I suggesting some 
neo-luddite stance of sorts. One should not make a leap from the imperfection of 
understanding to the uselessness of understanding altogether, nor from the imperfection of 
technology to the wholesale rejection of technology. Rather, the point is that understanding 
comes in degrees (the more so scientific understanding) and the same goes for the 
effectiveness of the technology that results from the implementation of such 
understanding. Therefore, hubris should be, even more specifically, seen as the deceitful 
and deceiving conviction that one has reached, or can ever reach, a sufficient degree of 
understanding and can rely on it to exert total control; in other words, you don’t need to 
think you are a genius to fall into hubris: it is enough that you think you have enough 
understanding when you don’t. One can still compare stages of understanding (and/or of 
effectiveness in controlling a specific portion of reality) and go for the best one, but no 
stage can and should be considered as the ultimate and absolute one. Ultimately, we are 
justified in thinking that the amusement parks and the androids were well worth being 
designed and developed! All trouble and threat rather stems from overconfidence in their 
possibilities, as well as in the creators’ ability to keep them under total control. Scientists 
should well keep striving to understand the human mind and possibly replicate it, 
including replicas designed for recreational purposes. Or, for that matter, they should 
strive to understand a malfunction and take the appropriate actions. However, they should 
also accept that their results are constantly provisional and incomplete, and that their best 
result, or most general theory, is a model that “predicts unpredictability” as the 
aforementioned Hoppenstand reminds us in his commentary on Jurassic Park.12  
It is not by accident that I have referred to Westworld as a “machine”–a metaphor 
that we can well extend to the sequel and the series. I have explained that one should not 
reject wholesale the creation of, and engagement with, machines. In this sense, when one 
thinks about the critical engagement with the movies at stake, analogous considerations 
hold valid. Engaging with these narrative machines is perfectly meaningful (and exciting) 
as an intellectual task as long as we accept that specific concepts that we can come up with 
to explain them may be as much enlightening and appealing as incomplete, and that the 
most general interpretation we can reach is, ultimately, that interpretations are always 
incomplete. In fact, understanding that one can never achieve total understanding may be 
assumed as a prescription of optimism, a motivator for scientific inquiry, when inquiry 
itself is regarded as a source of pleasure: if there is no end to investigation, there is no end 
to pleasure. 
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A side hypothesis: hubris may also be used to explain the very imperfection of the 
movies and the series. We may see their blatant shortcomings as the inevitably flawed 
outcome of the action of an inevitably flawed creator. Perhaps, at least in the case of 
Crichton’s movie, we may even interpret such flaws as intentionally produced by the 
creator himself, and exhibited in full sight, in order to teach the spectators about hubris. 
Crichton, in this sense, would be similar to an artist who consciously inserts a flaw into a 
painting or sculpture, or leaves some aspect of a work incomplete in order to make it even 
more explicit that no human creation is or can ever be perfect, stemming, as it does, from 
an imperfect mind. In other words, he would have represented hubris in the story while at 
the same time acknowledging his own as a creator.  
In sum, the concept of hubris proposed here allows us to explain the movie’s 
narrative shortcomings as well as the critics’ difficulties; I regard this last hypothesis as 
more worthwhile than any deflationary stance, including the moderate one.  
“We don’t know exactly how they work.” We can now better grasp the philosophical 
significance of this statement above and beyond its role in the 1973 movie. The utterance of 
Delos’ supervisor applies not only to the technicians and the machines, but to each and 
every sentient agent trying to grasp and dominate reality, including the very machines 
intent on pursuing tourists or in taking over the world—but it applies also to us as 
philosophical critics trying to make sense of the narratives. Taken as philosophical tales, 
the movie and the series can be seen as analogous to Plato’s aporetic dialogues. They end 
up, and they make the reader end up, in a stalemate, signifying the defeat of reason itself, 
the author’s as well as the reader’s, and they convey a Socratic lesson: we ultimately must 
recognize and accept that we don’t know.   
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teaching while leaving uncovered the most visible element of the movie itself (technology) is hardly 
convincing.   
6 Another discussion of this kind is Fuhse 2008. 
7 Dinello himself identifies “technology as a virus” as one of his technophobic macro-categories 
(Dinello 2005, 246 ff.). 
8 This expedient is also present in another well-known cyborg movie, Mark L. Lester’s Class of 
1999 (1990). In all likelihood, the same final destruction of the cyborg in a press at the end of The 
Terminator is reminiscent of such archetype. 
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9 Westworld was the first movie to use digitalized images (the gunslinger’s point of view). It is 
also mentioned as being (among) the first example(s) of reference to computer viruses. 
Futureworld was the first movie showing 3D computer-generated images.  
10 In fact, the concept of hubris changed in ancient Greece over time, shifting from the meaning 
of a violent and humiliating act (cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1378b) to the meaning I am using in this 
essay, exemplified by the myth of Icarus as well as by a wealth of tragic/mythological characters.  
11 One may object that this makes for two intertwined kinds of hubris: the overestimation of 
one’s capacity to understand reality and the overestimation of one’s impact on reality based on 
such understanding. In other words: having a false/incomplete model of oneself, and having a 
false/incomplete model of reality resulting from the former. I conflate them in the same term in 
order to avoid cluttering the discussion.  
12 Hoppenstand writes about the “prediction of unpredictability” in reference to the “theory of 
chaos” discussed and represented in Jurassic Park. The present one is not a paper about Crichton’s 
overall Weltanschauung and how it developed over time; however, since we are extensively 
touching upon his inventions and imagery, and since Westworld and Jurassic Park bear strong, 
mutual resemblances, we cannot fail to briefly discuss such a concept. The “chaos theory” is a 
branch of mathematics that Crichton narratively popularizes and proposes as a philosophical 
interpretation of reality as a whole (or, at least, of Jurassic Park’s reality). Following the suggestions 
offered so far, Crichton’s emphasis on, and narrative experimentation with, the concept of “chaos” 
looks like the engagement, on his behalf, with a specific facet of the problems posed by hubris as 
discussed in these pages. In other words, “chaos” is nothing else but the objective counterpart of 
(the humans’) subjective epistemic limitations. Humans detect “chaos” as a result of their limited 
capacities, and they incur great risks whenever they ignore it. “Chaos” is just one manifestation of 
humans’ limitations that they face when they are engaged in a highly sophisticated techno-scientific 
enterprise (e.g., cloning dinosaurs and keeping them under control). However, it is just the result of 
shortcomings that, more in general, also affect humans operating at other, “lower” levels of 
(intellectual and control-aimed) activity, as much as it affects other sentient beings including 
androids and dinosaurs. 
 
 
 
